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Abstract
While most of the literature concerned with indeterminacy and endogenous
cycles is based on the questionable assumption of a representative consumer,
some recent works have investigated the role of heterogeneous agents on dy-
namics. This paper adds a contribution to the debate, highlighting the eﬀects
of heterogeneity in consumers' preferences within an overlapping generations
economy with capital accumulation, endogenous labor supply and consump-
tion in both periods. Using a mean-preserving approach to heterogeneity, we
show that increasing the dispersion of propensities to save turns out to stabilize
the macroeconomic volatility, by reducing the range of parameters compati-
ble with indeterminacy and ruling out expectations-driven ﬂuctuations under a
suﬃciently large heterogeneity.
Keywords: Endogenous ﬂuctuations, heterogeneous preferences, mean-preserving
dispersion, overlapping generations.
Résumé
Alors que la plus grande partie de la littérature sur l'indétermination et les
cycles endogènes est basée sur l'hypothèse d'un consommateur représentatif,
certains travaux récents se sont intéressés au rôle de l'hétérogénéité des agents
sur la dynamique. Ce papier ajoute une contribution à ce débat, en mettant en
lumière les eﬀets de l'hétérogénéité des préférences dans un modèle à générations
imbriquées avec accumulation de capital, oﬀre de travail endogène et consom-
mation aux deux périodes de vie. En utilisant une mesure de la dispersion qui
garde la moyennne constante, nous montrons qu'une augmentation de la disper-
sion des propensions à épargner stabilise la volatilité macroéconomique, en ré-
duisant l'espace des paramètres compatible avec l'indétermination de l'équilibre
et en éliminant les ﬂuctuations dues à la volatilité des anticipations des agents
lorsque l'hétérogénéité est suﬃsamment importante.
Mots-clés: Fluctuations endogènes, préférences hétérogènes, dispersion préser-
vant la moyenne, générations imbriquées.
JEL classiﬁcation: C62, E32.
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, several papers have been devoted to ﬁnd conditions for
indeterminacy and endogenous cycles in intertemporal general equilibrium mod-
els, and shed light on the relevant mechanisms.2 One of the criticisms addressed
to this literature concerns the assumption of a representative agent as average
behavior either of an inﬁnite-lived population or of a ﬁnite-horizon generation.
How the dynamic properties of the model depend on such a reductive approach
has been seldom accounted for.
Nevertheless, some recent papers have introduced heterogeneous inﬁnite-
lived agents in dynamic models with capital accumulation. Ghiglino and Olszak-
Duquenne (2001), Ghiglino (2005), Bosi and Seegmuller (2006) and Ghiglino
and Venditti (2006) have focused on the role of consumers' diversity on the
occurrence of optimal cycles, whereas Ghiglino and Sorger (2002) and Ghiglino
and Olszak-Duquenne (2005) were mainly concerned with its inﬂuence on inde-
terminacy.3 All these papers prove that heterogeneity matters for endogenous
ﬂuctuations, but no clear-cut results seem to emerge.
Similar conclusions hold in the overlapping generations literature. A refer-
ence is, for instance, Ghiglino and Tvede (1995) who study an exchange economy
with many consumers and commodities.
In this paper, we take a step forward by analyzing an overlapping generations
model with heterogeneous consumers and capital accumulation, and therefore
connect the two previous types of contributions. The economy we care about is
competitive, populated by consumers living two periods, supplying labor when
young and consuming during their whole life span. As in d'Aspremont, Dos
Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet (1995), Seegmuller (2004) and Lloyd-Braga,
Nourry and Venditti (2006), preferences are homogeneous and non-separable
in current and future consumption, but separable in leisure. These restrictions
allow us to bring out parameters with economic signiﬁcance and interpretation,
such as the propensity to save or the elasticity of labor supply.
Heterogeneity in preferences has been less studied than heterogeneity in
fundamentals such as technology or endowments in regard to dynamic con-
sequences. To keep things as simple as possible, we introduce heterogeneity
through two types of consumers who diﬀer in their propensities to save. In
order to assess the pure eﬀect of heterogeneity on the occurrence of endoge-
nous ﬂuctuations, we adopt a mean-preserving approach, while increasing the
consumers' dispersion. In a way, we also contribute to a recent debate on the
existing link between indeterminacy and the degree of propensity to save in over-
lapping generations economies characterized by a representative consumer.4
2For a survey, the reader is referred to Benhabib and Farmer (1999).
3In order to account for binding ﬁnance or borrowing constraints, some economists have in-
troduced another kind of heterogeneity, through the discount rates, in inﬁnite-horizon models.
See, among others, Woodford (1986), Becker and Foias (1987, 1994) and Sorger (1994).
4Indeed, as it has been established by Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004, 2006), indeterminacy
requires a suﬃciently high propensity to save in economies with constant returns to scale or
capital externalities, whereas it is no longer the case when labor externalities are at stake
(Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006)).
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The geometrical method developed by Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder
(1998) is worthwhile to analyze the role of heterogeneity on the occurrence of
local indeterminacy and local bifurcations. Under constant returns to scale, we
ﬁnd that increasing heterogeneity reduces the range of parameters (elasticity
of labor supply, capital-labor substitution) such that indeterminacy occurs. In
particular, ﬂuctuations due to self-fulﬁlling prophecies no longer occur when the
labor supply is suﬃciently elastic. In addition, we prove that, beyond a threshold
of saving rate dispersion, indeterminacy is deﬁnitely ruled out. We conclude that
under constant returns, heterogeneity stabilizes endogenous ﬂuctuations.
However, under constant returns and without heterogeneity, the emergence
of endogenous ﬂuctuations requires two quite restrictive conditions in overlap-
ping generations economies: Namely, a weak substitution between capital and
labor5 and a high propensity to save6. Fortunately, Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and
Venditti (2006) prove that these restrictions are no more needed in presence
of productive labor externalities. So, on the one side, (mild) labor externalities
make the parameters range more plausible, and on the other side, it allows us to
check the robustness of results in economies characterized by increasing returns,
even if expectations-driven ﬂuctuations require slightly diﬀerent conditions.
As a matter of fact, we show that indeterminacy becomes less likely under
a higher degree of heterogeneity, because the range of parameters for indeter-
minacy shrinks. Moreover, as under constant returns, indeterminacy no longer
occurs for a suﬃciently elastic labor supply and it is ruled out when the disper-
sion of the propensities to save becomes large enough. Therefore, in contrast to
most of the existing results, we provide clear-cut conditions about the inﬂuence
of heterogeneity on endogenous ﬂuctuations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model
and deﬁne the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 3 is devoted to the existence
of a steady state. In section 4, we analyze the local dynamics assuming, at
ﬁrst, constant returns and, then, increasing returns. Concluding remarks are
provided in section 5, while computational details are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The model
Heterogeneity in consumers' preferences is introduced in a discrete time over-
lapping generations model with capital accumulation (t = 1, 2, . . .). Markets are
supposed to be perfectly competitive.
In contrast to the consumers' side, the production sector is homogeneous:
A representative ﬁrm is supposed to produce a unique ﬁnal good by means of
a constant returns to scale technology which employs capital (kt−1) and labor
(lt). Production is also aﬀected by aggregate labor externalities ψ (l).7 The
5This assumption is not in accordance with some recent empirical studies. See, in partic-
ular, Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000).
6This condition has been criticized, for instance, by Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004).
7Capital externalities are not introduced in the economy because, as it is shown by Caz-
zavillan and Pintus (2006) and Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), they fail to promote
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amount of ﬁnal good yt, yielded in period t, is given by yt = Aψ (lt) f (at) lt,
where A > 0 is a scaling parameter. f and at ≡ kt−1/lt represent an intensive
production function and the capital intensity, respectively. On the technological
side, we further assume:
Assumption 1 The production function f (a) is continuous for a ≥ 0, positive-
valued and continuously diﬀerentiable as many times as needed for a > 0, with
f ′′ (a) < 0 < f ′ (a).
The externality function ψ (l) is continuous for l ≥ 0, positive-valued and dif-
ferentiable as many times as needed for l > 0. Moreover, εψ (l) ≡ lψ′ (l) /ψ (l) ≥
0.
Notice that when εψ (l) = 0, there are no externalities and returns to scale
become constant, whereas under εψ (l) > 0, returns to scale are increasing to a
degree 1 + εψ (l).
As usual, the representative ﬁrm maximizes the proﬁt, which determines
the real interest rate rt and the real wage wt. If we set ρ (a) ≡ f ′ (a) and
ω (a) ≡ f (a)− af ′ (a), we get immediately:
rt = Aψ (lt) ρ (at) ≡ r (kt−1, lt)
wt = Aψ (lt)ω (at) ≡ w (kt−1, lt)
Two identities of interest relate the elasticities of ρ and ω to the capital
share in total income α (a) ≡ af ′ (a) /f (a) ∈ (0, 1) and to the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution σ (a) > 0:8
aρ′ (a) /ρ (a) = − [1− α (a)] /σ (a) (1)
aω′ (a) /ω (a) = α (a) /σ (a) (2)
On the consumption side, there are overlapping generations of two-period-
lived consumers. Population is constant and the total size of a generation is
normalized to unity. In order to keep things as simple as possible, but without
loosing generality, we reduce consumers' heterogeneity to two types of agents,
labeled with i = 1, 2. We note λi ∈ [0, 1] the relative size of the ith class of
consumers, which is held constant over time. By deﬁnition, λ1 + λ2 = 1. Each
agent supplies labor only in the ﬁrst period of life, saves through productive
capital and consumes in both periods.9 Preferences of a consumer of type i are
summarized by a non-separable utility function in consumption of both periods,
but separable in consumption and labor:
Ui (ci1t, ci2t+1) /Bi − vi (lit) (3)
endogenous ﬂuctuations in overlapping generations models with consumption in both periods.
8Identities (1) and (2) are straightforwardly deduced from 1/σ (a) = aω′ (a) /ω (a) −
aρ′ (a) /ρ (a) and ω′ (a) = −aρ′ (a).
9The length of a period (half a life) accounts for the full capital depreciation during the
period.
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where ci1t (ci2t+1) is the consumption during the ﬁrst (second) period of life, lit
the labor supply and Bi > 0 a scaling parameter. The properties of the utility
function are now speciﬁed:10
Assumption 2 The function Ui (ci1, ci2) is continuous for ci1 ≥ 0 and ci2 ≥ 0
with continuous derivatives of any required order for ci1 > 0 and ci2 > 0. More-
over, Ui (ci1, ci2) is increasing in ci1 and ci2, strictly quasi-concave, homoge-
neous of degree one and such that the underlying indiﬀerence curves never cross
the axes.
The function vi (li) is continuous for 0 ≤ li ≤ Li with continuous derivatives
of any required order for 0 < li < Li, where Li denotes the positive, ﬁnite or even
inﬁnite, labor endowment. Furthermore, we assume that vi (li) is increasing and
convex, and satisﬁes limli→0 v′i (li) = 0 and limli→Li v′i (li) = +∞.
In the youth, the labor income wtlit is consumed (ci1t) and saved (kit). In
the retirement age, the capital income rt+1kit is consumed (ci2t+1). So, the ith
type consumer faces two budget constraints:
ci1t + kit = wtlit (4)
ci2t+1 = rt+1kit (5)
Consumer computes the optimal levels of consumption and saving by maximiz-
ing the utility function (3) under the budget constraints (4) and (5). Using the
intertemporal condition:11
Ui1 (ci1t, ci2t+1)
Ui2 (ci1t, ci2t+1)
= rt+1 (6)
we ﬁnd the optimal levels:
ci1t = [1− si (rt+1)]wtlit (7)
ci2t+1 = rt+1si (rt+1)wtlit (8)
kit = si (rt+1)wtlit (9)
where si (rt+1) ∈ (0, 1) is the propensity to save and 1−si (rt+1) the propensity
to consume (when young).12 The consumption ratio becomes a function, say qi,
of the real interest rate
ci1t
ci2t+1
=
1− si (rt+1)
si (rt+1) rt+1
≡ qi (rt+1)
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ηi > 0 can be viewed as elasticity
of qi (in absolute value):
ηi (rt+1) = −
q′i (rt+1) rt+1
qi (rt+1)
= 1 +
s′i (rt+1) rt+1
si (rt+1) [1− si (rt+1)] (10)
10Similar preferences have been used, among others, by d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira
and Gérard-Varet (1995), Seegmuller (2004), Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006).
11Where Uij ≡ ∂Ui (x1, x2) /∂xj denotes a marginal utility.12More details are provided in the Appendix.
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Of course, si is decreasing for 0 < ηi < 1 (intertemporal complementarity),
increasing for ηi > 1 (intertemporal substitutability) and constant for ηi = 1:
Savings increase (decrease) with respect to the interest rate under intertemporal
substitutability (complementarity), whereas they don't depend on rt+1 when
ηi = 1.
Replacing (7) and (8) into the function Ui (ci1t, ci2t+1), we get also the con-
sumption utility level for a unit of labor income wtlit = 1: U∗i (rt+1) /Bi with
U∗i (r) ≡ Ui (1− si (r) , si (r) r). As shown in the Appendix, the saving rate is
also the elasticity of U∗i :
rU∗′i (r) /U
∗
i (r) = si (r) ∈ (0, 1) (11)
By deﬁnition of U∗i , the consumption-leisure arbitrage for a consumer of type
i simpliﬁes to:
U∗i (rt+1)wt = Biv
′
i (lit) (12)
Let εvi (li) ≡ liv′′i (li) /v′i (li) > 0 be the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
labor (Assumption 2): The labor supply increases in the real wage with elasticity
1/εvi (li).
Since the aggregate capital is given by kt = λ1k1t + λ2k2t, where kit is
determined by (9), we can deﬁne an intertemporal equilibrium as a sequence
(kt−1, lt)
∞
t=1 that meets the following conditions:
kt = [λ1s1 (r (kt, lt+1)) l1t + λ2s2 (r (kt, lt+1)) l2t]w (kt−1, lt) (13)
lt = λ1l1t + λ2l2t (14)
where the heterogeneous labor supplies are given by:
lit ≡ v′−1i [U∗i (r (kt, lt+1))w (kt−1, lt) /Bi] ≡ li (kt−1, lt, kt, lt+1) (15)
We remark that the capital kt−1 is the predetermined variable of this two-
dimensional dynamic system (13)-(14). The intertemporal sequence of kt−1 and
lt, enables us to determine all the other variables, namely lit, kit, ci1t, ci2t, yt.
In order to study the local dynamics and analyze the role of heterogeneity
in preferences on the stability properties of the economy, we ﬁrst establish the
existence of a steady state and then we linearize the system in a neighborhood.
3 Steady state
A stationary state of dynamic system (13)-(14) is a solution (k, l) of the system:
k = [λ1s1 (r (k, l)) l1 + λ2s2 (r (k, l)) l2]w (k, l) (16)
l = λ1l1 + λ2l2 (17)
with
li = v′−1i [U
∗
i (r (k, l))w (k, l) /Bi] (18)
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Following Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pintus (1998), we prove the exis-
tence of a normalized steady state such that k = l1 = l2 = 1, that is l = 1, by
setting appropriately the scaling parameters A,B1, B2 > 0.13
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a steady state of sys-
tem (13)-(14) such that k = l1 = l2 = 1, and therefore l = 1, if and only
if:
lim
A→+∞
g (A) > 1/ (ψ (1) [f (1)− f ′ (1)]) (19)
where
g (A) ≡ A [λ1s1 (Aψ (1) f ′ (1)) + λ2s2 (Aψ (1) f ′ (1))] (20)
and A, Bi are the unique solutions of:
g (A) = 1/ (ψ (1) [f (1)− f ′ (1)]) (21)
Bi = U∗i (r (1, 1))w (1, 1) /v
′
i (1) (22)
Proof. A steady state k = l1 = l2 = 1 is deﬁned by (21)-(22). To establish the
existence of this steady state, we need to prove that there is a unique solution
A > 0, Bi > 0 to these equations. The function g (A) deﬁned by (20) is
continuous and increasing (see the Appendix) and limA→0 g (A) = 0. Therefore,
according to inequality (19), there is a unique solution A > 0 to equation (21).
Moreover, since U∗i (r (1, 1))w (1, 1) /v′i (1) > 0, one can immediately see that
there exist unique solutions Bi > 0 to (22).
Throughout the rest of the paper, Proposition 1 will be supposed to hold
and no longer referred.
4 Local dynamics
In order to know how heterogeneity in consumers' preferences could aﬀect the
occurrence of endogenous ﬂuctuations, we study the local dynamics. Two main
ﬁndings deserve attention:
• An increase of heterogeneity in consumers' propensities to save stabilizes
the economy by reducing the range of parameters compatible with the
equilibrium multiplicity, and hence with ﬂuctuations due to self-fulﬁlling
expectations;
• A suﬃciently important heterogeneity can deﬁnitely eliminate indetermi-
nacy.
Local analysis consists in diﬀerentiating dynamic system (13)-(14) in a neigh-
borhood of the steady state (k, l) = (1, 1) with l1 = l2 = 1. In what fol-
lows, we deﬁne α ≡ α (1), σ ≡ σ (1), εψ ≡ εψ (1), si ≡ si (Aψ (1) f ′ (1)) and
13For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the local dynamics around the normalized steady
state without characterizing the possible existence of other stationary states.
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ηi ≡ ηi (Aψ (1) f ′ (1)), while εvi denotes the elasticity of v′i (li) evaluated at the
steady state.
Notice that propensities si, elasticities ηi and εvi sum up the fundamental
information about preferences and, therefore, about consumers' heterogeneity.
For simplicity, we will focus on the case with no heterogeneity in the elastici-
ties of labor disutility.14 Finally, we also assume intertemporal substitutability
between consumption in both periods for each type of agent.15
Assumption 3 εv1 = εv2 ≡ εv and ηi ≥ 1.
Denoting by J the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state (k, l) =
(1, 1), local dynamics are represented by a linear system (dkt/k, dlt+1/l)T =
J (dkt−1/k, dlt/l)
T .
In the sequel, we exploit the fact that the trace T and the determinant D of
the Jacobian matrix are the sum and the product of the eigenvalues, respectively.
Following Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (1998), the stability properties of
the system, that is, the location of the eigenvalues with respect to the unit circle,
will be characterized in the (T,D)-plane (see Figures 1-6). More precisely, we
evaluate the characteristic polynomial P (µ) ≡ µ2 − Tµ + D = 0 at −1, 0, 1.
On the line (AB), one eigenvalue is equal to −1, i.e., P (−1) = 1 + T +D = 0.
On the line (AC), one eigenvalue is equal to 1, i.e., P (1) = 1 − T + D = 0.
On the segment [BC], the two eigenvalues are complex conjugates with a unit
modulus, i.e., D = 1 and |T | < 2. The steady state is a sink when D < 1
and |T | < 1 + D. It is a saddle point when |1 +D| < |T |. It is a source
otherwise. Therefore, the steady state is locally indeterminate if and only if
(T,D) is inside the triangle (ABC) and is locally determinate otherwise. A
transcritical bifurcation generically occurs when (T,D) crosses the line (AC), a
ﬂip bifurcation generically occurs when (T,D) crosses the line (AB), whereas a
Hopf bifurcation generically emerges when (T,D) crosses the segment [BC].
The determinant D and the trace T of matrix J are given by:16
D =
α
s
1 + εv
1− α+ σεψ > 0 (23)
T =
α+ s (1− α) + (s− σ − εs) εψ + [σ + (1− α) εs] εv +
(
1− α− εψεv
)
h
s
s (1− α+ σεψ)
(24)
where:
14Recently, Bosi and Seegmuller (2005) have characterized the role of heterogeneity in labor
disutility on the occurrence of local indeterminacy in a closely related framework. Considering
an overlapping generations model with consumption only in the second period of life, they have
shown that consumers' preferences are summarized by a weighted elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the real wage: In other terms, a mean-preserving increase of heterogeneity
does not aﬀect local dynamics.
15A similar assumption is made by Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004, 2006) and Lloyd-Braga,
Nourry and Venditti (2006).
16More details are provided in the Appendix.
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• s ≡ λ1s1 + λ2s2 is the average propensity to save weighted by the popu-
lation sizes;
• εs = λ1s1λ1s1+λ2s2 εs1 + λ2s2λ1s1+λ2s2 εs2 is the elasticity of the average saving
rate s and can be reinterpreted as a weighted average of the individual
elasticities εsi ≡ rs′i (r) /si (r) = (1− si) (ηi − 1);
• h ≡ λ1 (s1 − s)2 + λ2 (s2 − s)2 is the variance of the propensities to save.
To understand the role of heterogeneity in preferences on the local dynam-
ics, we need to deﬁne a signiﬁcant measure of heterogeneity and observe the
consequences of raising this measure.
The propensity to save si is an informative parameter to capture the dynamic
eﬀect of preferences. As stressed by Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004, 2006) and
Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), this parameter plays a key role on
the occurrence of indeterminacy in overlapping generations economies with a
representative consumer.17
To take one step forward, we address a worthwhile question: What are
the implications on local indeterminacy when one raises the dispersion of saving
rates in an economy with heterogeneous consumers? Since the most satisfactory
way of appreciating the role heterogeneity is to keep the ﬁrst order moments as
given, we preserve explicitly the mean s of the propensities to save and the mean
of their elasticities εs,18 while raising their variance h, our signiﬁcant measure
of heterogeneity.
The main results of the paper are proved in the following: More heterogeneity
in consumers' preferences reduces the range of parameters for indeterminacy
and can rule out endogenous ﬂuctuations. The cases of constant and increasing
returns to scale are successively studied.
4.1 Constant returns (εψ = 0)
Under constant returns to scale, the production sector does not beneﬁt from
labor externalities, i.e., εψ = 0. Local dynamics, that is, the occurrence of
indeterminacy and endogenous cycles, are characterized through a raise of het-
erogeneity in preferences.
According to empirical estimates, the capital share in total income α is sup-
posed to be smaller than one half. In addition, we pay attention to a suﬃciently
high average propensity to save s and we assume the elasticities of intertemporal
substitution ηi to be suﬃciently close to one.
Assumption 4 α < 1/2, εs < α/ (1− α) < s.
17In order to obtain indeterminacy, the propensity to save is required to be suﬃciently high
under constant returns to scale or capital externalities, while such restriction is no longer
needed in the presence of labor externalities.
18Note that keeping εs as constant is possible through an appropriate choice of η1 and η2.
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Consider the general expressions (23) and (24) and let
D0 ≡ α/ [(1− α) s] (25)
T0 ≡ 1 +D0 + h/s2 (26)
be the determinant and the trace when the labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic
(εv = 0) under constant returns (εψ = 0). Still using (23) and (24), the trace
and the determinant can now be written as:
D = D0 (1 + εv) (27)
T = T0 +D0εv/S (σ) (28)
where
S (σ) ≡ α/ [σ + (1− α) εs] (29)
When the bifurcation parameter εv varies from 0 to +∞, the pair (T,D)
describes a half-line ∆0 in the (T,D)-plane, with origin (T0, D0) and slope S (σ).
-
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Figure 1: Constant returns (εψ = 0) and no heterogeneity (h = 0)
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Figure 2: Constant returns (εψ = 0) and heterogeneity with h > 0 not too large
The origin (T0, D0) does not depend on σ, while D0 and the slope S don't
depend on h (see (25), (26) and (29)). The two parameters σ and h characterize
unambiguously the position of ∆0: When σ increases, ∆0 makes a clockwise
rotation around the invariant starting point (T0, D0), while ∆0 translates hori-
zontally right toward when h increases.
More precisely, on the one hand, the slope S (σ) decreases from S (0) =
α/ [(1− α) εs], which is greater than 1 under Assumption 4, to 0, as long as σ
tends to +∞, and S (σ) = 1 for σ = α − (1− α) εs ≡ σT . On the other hand,
T0 increases with h, while D0 remains invariant and belongs to (0, 1) under
Assumption 4.
According to (26), without heterogeneity (h = 0) the starting point (T0, D0)
is on the line (AC) between the horizontal axis and C. Moreover, when σ < σT ,
the half-line ∆0 lies above the line (AC) and crosses the segment [BC] for
εv = s (1− α) /α− 1 ≡ εvH , whereas ∆0 lies below the line (AC) for all σ > σT
(see Figure 1).
A degree of heterogeneity in the propensities to save, makes h strictly posi-
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Figure 3: Constant returns (εψ = 0) and heterogeneity with h > h1
tive. The origin (T0, D0) turns out to lie below the line (AC).
First consider a slight degree of heterogeneity:
h < h1 ≡ s1− α
α
(
s− α
1− α
)(
α
1− α − εs
)
and deﬁne εvT ≡ h (1− α) / [s (α− (1− α) εs − σ)] as the bifurcation value for
εv corresponding to the intersection of ∆0 and (AC). We also note that the
critical value of σ such that ∆0 goes through C is given by:
σC ≡ α− (1− α) εs − 1− α
s (1− α) /α− 1
h
s
∈ (0, σT )
Therefore, when σ < σC , the half-line ∆0, which starts below the line (AC),
ﬁrst crosses (AC) below C and then the segment [BC]. When σC < σ < σT ,
the slope S (σ) remains greater than 1, but ∆0 crosses now the line (AC) above
C. Finally, when σ > σT , the slope S (σ) becomes smaller than 1 and ∆0 lies
entirely below the line (AC) (see Figure 2).
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Assume now a higher degree of heterogeneity h ≥ h1: The critical value
σC becomes negative. This means that, whatever σ (even close to 0), the half-
line ∆0 lies outside the triangle (ABC), on the right side of C (see Figure 3).
Therefore, when σ < σT , the half-line ∆0, which starts below the line (AC),
crosses (AC) above C. When σ ≥ σT , as seen, ∆0 lies entirely below (AC).
These results are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 (Constant returns) If Assumptions 3-4 are satisﬁed, the fol-
lowing generically holds.
1. No heterogeneity (h = 0).
(i) When 0 < σ < σT , the steady state is a sink for 0 < εv < εvH ,
undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at εv = εvH , is a source for εv > εvH .
(ii) When σ > σT , the steady state is a saddle for all εv > 0.
2. Moderate heterogeneity (0 < h < h1).
(i) When 0 < σ < σC , the steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvT ,
undergoes a transcritical bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a sink for εvT <
εv < εvH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at εv = εvH , is source for
εv > εvH .
(ii) When σC < σ < σT , the steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvT ,
undergoes a transcritical bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a source for εv >
εvT .
(iii) When σ ≥ σT , the steady state is a saddle for all εv > 0.
3. Large heterogeneity (h ≥ h1).
(i) When 0 < σ < σT , the steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvT ,
undergoes a transcritical bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a source for εv >
εvT .
(ii) When σ ≥ σT , the steady state is a saddle for all εv > 0.
Proposition 2 shows that without heterogeneity in the propensities to save
(case 1), expectations-driven ﬂuctuations need not only a weak capital-labor
substitution (σ < σT ≤ α), but also a suﬃciently elastic labor supply with
respect to the real wage. In particular, indeterminacy can emerge under an
inﬁnitely elastic labor supply, that is, a linear disutility of labor (εv = 0).
Under a moderate degree of heterogeneity (case 2), on one side, the emer-
gence of endogenous ﬂuctuations requires a weaker substitution between capital
and labor (σ < σC < σT ). Furthermore, since σC linearly decreases with h, the
larger the heterogeneity degree, the smaller the range of capital-labor substitu-
tion compatible with indeterminacy. On the other side, heterogeneity has also a
negative eﬀect on indeterminacy by reducing the range (εvT , εvH ), given σ < σC .
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If the higher bound εvH does not depend on the degree of heterogeneity,19 there
is now a lower bound εvT > 0, increasing with the level of heterogeneity. This
means that endogenous ﬂuctuations are no longer possible under highly or even
inﬁnitely elastic labor supply, in sharp contrast with most of the existing results,
mainly found using one-sector models, which suggest that a more elastic labor
supply promotes ﬂuctuations due to animal spirits.
Eventually, when heterogeneity becomes suﬃciently high (case 3), the oc-
currence of endogenous ﬂuctuations is ruled out. In fact, indeterminacy (and
Hopf bifurcations as well) no longer occurs, when the second order moment h
is higher than a threshold.20
We are now able to provide an interpretation of these results, by focusing
on the existence of self-fulﬁlling expectations. For simplicity, we restrict our
attention to the case where the propensities to save are constant, i.e., η1 = η2 =
1, so entailing εs = 0. Assume that agents coordinate their expectations on
an increase of the future real interest rate. Since dlit/li = (si/εv) (drt+1/r),
each agent increases his labor supply. Therefore, the eﬀect on the aggregate
labor supply is determined by dlt/l = λ1dl1t/l1 + λ2dl2t/l2 = (s/εv) (drt+1/r).
Noticing
kt = (λ1s1l1t + λ2s2l2t)wt
we observe that an increase of labor supply of each type of agent has two eﬀects
on capital accumulation, one through the individual labor supplies and their
impacts on the terms in parentheses, another one through the aggregate labor
supply and its impact on the wage. Taking into account these two channels and
following an increase of the expected real interest rate, the variation of capital
accumulation depends on two opposite eﬀects deﬁned by:
1. dktk =
(
s
εv
+ hsεv
)
drt+1
r ;
2. dktk = −ασ sεv
drt+1
r .
Expectations are self-fulﬁlling if capital accumulation reduces, because, in
this case, the future real interest rate increases. Therefore, the second (negative)
eﬀect has to dominate the ﬁrst one. Without heterogeneity (h = 0), this requires
σ < σT = α. However, increasing heterogeneity (h > 0) reinforces the ﬁrst
eﬀect which promotes determinacy. This explains why, when consumers are
heterogeneous, indeterminacy requires more restrictive conditions and can be
even ruled out. One can further notice that, by direct inspection of the ﬁrst
eﬀect, the smaller εv, the more stringent the impact of heterogeneity.
As we have seen, the occurrence of endogenous ﬂuctuations under constant
returns to scale requires at least two demanding conditions. On one hand, one
need a suﬃciently weak substitution between capital and labor, which is not
in accordance with empirical results (see Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000)). As
19The invariance of εvH entails also that the instability range (εvH ,+∞) does not widen.20We remark that, since 0 < si < 1, h is strictly less than 1/4 and thus the result established
in the third case of Proposition 2 matters, if either s or εs remain close to the bound α/ (1− α),
in order to ensure that h1 < 1/4.
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shown in Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), this condition is no longer
required as soon as labor externalities are introduced in the production sector.
On the other hand, a too high propensity to save is open to criticism as well.21
However, as stressed also by Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), under
productive labor externalities, this assumption is no longer needed.
So there are at least two good reasons to study the case where returns to scale
are increasing under the eﬀect of labor externalities and to check the robustness
of the ﬁndings obtained under constant returns.
4.2 Increasing returns (εψ > 0)
Henceforth, we assume εψ > 0 involving positive externalities and increasing
returns. In order to verify the robustness of our results, namely the positive
role of heterogeneity in preferences for equilibrium determinacy, we study how
local dynamics and the stability properties of the steady state vary in response
to a mean-preserving change in h, the variance of saving rates.
To keep matters as simple as possible, not only we maintain Assumption
3, but also we assume an average propensity to save neither too low nor too
high (as suggested by empirical evidence). In addition, according to the em-
pirical literature, a too weak capital-labor substitution is excluded (see Duﬀy
and Papageorgiou (2000)) and, as under constant returns to scale, a too large
intertemporal substitution is not allowed.
Assumption 5 Let εs < s < α/ (1− α) with s > 1−
(
3−√1 + 8α) / [2 (1− α)],
and σ > max {α− (1− α) εs, (s− εs) / (1− s)}.
As above, we characterize the stability properties of the steady state and
the occurrence of bifurcations in the (T,D)-plane and we choose εv ∈ (0,+∞)
as bifurcation parameter to handle.
The analysis is made more diﬃcult by the non-linear term εψ/εv appearing
in (24). A direct inspection of (23) and (24) tells us that, as εv varies, (T,D)
describes two diﬀerent kind of curves for h = 0 and h > 0. In the ﬁrst case, the
locus is a half-line, whereas in the second one, it becomes a branch of hyperbole.
For the sake of clarity, it is appropriate to study ﬁrst local dynamics without
heterogeneity and then to stress the main diﬀerences arising when h becomes
strictly positive.
4.2.1 Representative agent (h = 0)
Assuming h = 0, let
D1 = α/ [s (1− α+ σεψ)] (30)
T1 = 1 +D1 (1− εψ [σ (1 + s) + εs − s] /α)
21See, among others, Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004).
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be the trace and the determinant when εv = 0 (inﬁnitely elastic labor supply).
Using (23) and (24), the determinant D and the trace T simplify:
D = D1 (1 + εv) (31)
T = T1 +D1εv/S (σ) (32)
where S (σ) is still given by (29). When εv increases from 0 to +∞, (T,D)
describes a half-line ∆1 with origin (T1, D1) and slope S (σ), which is given by
(29) and belongs to (0, 1) under Assumption 5.
We compute two critical degrees of externality:
εψH ≡ [α− s (1− α)] / (σs)
εψF ≡ 2 [α+ s (1− α)] / [σ (1− s) + εs − s]
First we notice that Assumption 5 ensures εψH < εψF .
22 Moreover,
1− T1 +D1 = εψ [σ (1 + s) + εs − s]D1/α (33)
1 + T1 +D1 =
(
εψF − εψ
)
[σ (1− s) + εs − s]D1/α (34)
In order to locate the origin of∆1, we ﬁnd from (31) thatD1 belongs to (0, 1)
when εψH < εψ. The last inequality in Assumption 5 implies that the right-
hand sides of (33) and (34) are positive if εψ > 0 and εψ < εψF , respectively.
So when εψH < εψ < εψF , the starting point (T1, D1) lies above the horizontal
axis inside (ABC) and, since T and D are both increasing in εv and the slope
of ∆1 belongs to (0, 1), the half-line ∆1 crosses the line (AC) or the segment
[BC].
In what follows, we deﬁne εvH and εvT the critical values of εv such that
D = 1 and 1− T +D = 0, respectively. From (31)-(32), it follows that:
εvH ≡ s (1− α+ σεψ) /α− 1 = 1/D1 − 1 (35)
εvT ≡ εψ [σ (1 + s) + εs − s] / [σ + (1− α) εs − α] (36)
We notice that εvH < εvT if and only if:
εψ
[
sσ − α σ (1 + s) + εs − s
σ + (1− α) εs − α
]
< α− s (1− α) (37)
Under condition (37), the half-line lies above C, i.e., ∆1 crosses the segment
[BC] before the line (AC) (see Figure 4).23
We can now summarize the conditions for indeterminacy and endogenous
cycles when there is no heterogeneity in the propensities to save, i.e., h = 0.
22The inequality εψH < εψF is equivalent to (s− εs) [s (1− α)− α] <
σ
[
(1− α) s2 + (1 + 2α) s− α]. Under Assumption 5, the left-hand side is strictly neg-
ative, while the right-hand side is strictly positive.
23We observe that inequality (37) is compatible with εψH < εψ .
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Figure 4: Increasing returns (εψ > 0) and no heterogeneity (h = 0)
Proposition 3 (Increasing returns without heterogeneity (h = 0)) If
Assumptions 3 and 5, and inequalities εψH < εψ < εψF and (37) are satisﬁed,
the following generically holds.
The steady state is a sink for 0 < εv < εvH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at
εv = εvH , is a source for εvH < εv < εvT , undergoes a transcritical bifurcation
at εv = εvT , is a saddle for εv > εvT .
Proposition 3 establishes that local indeterminacy and endogenous cycles
occur under small increasing returns, a weak propensity to save and substi-
tutable production factors.24 In this respect, as it has initially been proved by
Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), endogenous ﬂuctuations arise under
mild conditions in such overlapping generations economies. More speciﬁcally,
we observe that indeterminacy can occur if labor supply is suﬃciently elastic
(εv < εvH ).
24If ψ > ψF , local indeterminacy is not excluded. However, since increasing returns arerequired to be high, in contrast with empirical studies, we have omitted this case in Proposition
3.
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4.2.2 Heterogeneity (h > 0)
Assume now that propensities to save are heterogeneous. By direct inspection
of equations (23) and (24), we remark that D does not depend on h, whereas
∂T/∂h > 0 if and only if εv > ε∗v ≡ εψ/ (1− α).
The analysis simpliﬁes under an additional mild restriction.
Assumption 6
σ <
α/s
1− α +
1
ε∗v
(
α/s
1− α − 1
)
(38)
Condition (38) is not too restrictive: The elasticity of capital-labor substitu-
tion is bounded from above by a value that is greater than 1 under Assumption
5. Inequality (38) entails that εvH < ε∗v, where, as before, εvH is deﬁned by
D = 1 and does not depend on h.
In order to characterize local dynamics when heterogeneity matters, we need
to know how the pair (T,D) moves in the plane when the bifurcation parameter
εv varies in the range (0,+∞). The new locus, say ∆2, is a branch of hyperbole
(instead of a half-line) which depends on the degree of heterogeneity.
Let γ ≡ α (1− σ) − (1− α+ εψ) (σ + εs − s). The system (23)-(24) gives
implicitly D as a function of T , D ≡ D (T ). For simplicity, we deﬁne the inverse
relation:
T (D) =
D1
α
[
γ +
αD/D1
S (σ)
+
(
1− α− εψ
D/D1 − 1
)
h
s
]
, with D > D1 (39)
We ﬁnd easily that D (T ) is an increasing and convex function.25
In addition, we observe that limεv→0 (T,D) = (−∞, D1), that is, a hori-
zontal asymptote bounds from below ∆2 on the left side. On the right side,
limεv→+∞ (T,D) = (+∞,+∞). Moreover ∆2 crosses ∆1 from above only once,
exactly for εv = ε∗v (see Figure 5). This intersection point is invariant to h.
Two cases matters according to the location of ∆2 with respect to B. We
notice that ∆2 goes through B = (−2, 1), when
h2 ≡ γ + [σ + 2α+ (1− α) εs] /D1
αεψ/s− σ
(
εψ − εψH
)
(1− α) σs
(
εψ − εψH
)
(40)
where D1 is given by (30).
When heterogeneity is moderate (0 < h < h2), ∆2 lies below B. By direct
inspection of Figure 5, we deduce that∆2 is below the line (AB) for 0 < εv < εvF
25Diﬀerentiating (39), we obtain:
T ′ (D) =
1
S (σ)
+
εψ
α (D/D1 − 1)2
h
s
> 0
T ′′ (D) = − 2εψ
αD1 (D/D1 − 1)3
h
s
< 0
and, ﬁnally, D′ (T ) = 1/T ′ (D) > 0 and D′′ (T ) = −T ′′ (D) / [T ′ (D)]3 > 0.
19
(high elasticity of labor supply). When εv goes through εvF , (T,D) crosses the
line (AB). (T,D) lies inside the triangle (ABC) for εvF < εv < εvH . (T,D)
crosses the segment [BC] when εv goes through εvH , and lies above (ABC)
for εvH < εv < εvT . After crossing the line (AC) when εv goes through εvT ,
eventually (T,D) lies on the right side of (AC) for εv > εvT (weak elasticity of
labor supply).26
On the contrary, when heterogeneity is large (h > h2), ∆2 lies above B (see
Figure 6). In this case, as εv moves from 0 to +∞, ∆2 starts on the left side of
the line (AB) (0 < εv < εvF ), crosses (AB) above B (εv = εvF ), goes through
the line (AC) (εv = εvT ) and deﬁnitely lies on the right-hand side of (AC)
(εv > εvT ).
-
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Figure 5: Increasing returns (εψ > 0) and heterogeneity with h > 0 not too
large
26As above, εvF , εvH and εvT are the values of the elasticity εv corresponding to the
intersections of ∆2 with (AB), [BC] and (AC), respectively. For briefness, we omit the
expression of εvT , whereas εvH is given by (35) and εvF by (48) in the Appendix.
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Figure 6: Increasing returns (εψ > 0) and heterogeneity with h > h2
Conditions for indeterminacy and endogenous cycles are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Increasing returns) If Assumptions 3, 5 and 6, and inequal-
ities εψH < εψ < εψF and (37) are satisﬁed, the following generically holds.
1. Moderate heterogeneity (0 < h < h2).
The steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvF , undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation
at εv = εvF , is a sink for εvF < εv < εvH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation
at εv = εvH , is a source for εvH < εv < εvT , undergoes a transcritical
bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a saddle for εv > εvT .
2. Large heterogeneity (h > h2).
The steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvF , undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation
at εv = εvF , is a source for εvF < εv < εvT , undergoes a transcritical
bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a saddle for εv > εvT .
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When a moderate degree of heterogeneity in the saving rates is introduced
(Proposition 4, case 1), indeterminacy no longer emerges for a highly elastic
labor supply. There is now a lower bound εvF for values of εv compatible with
indeterminacy. More precisely, indeterminacy arises if and only if the elasticity
εv belongs to the interval (εvF , εvH ). This interval shrinks with h, the degree of
heterogeneity. Indeed εvH does not depend on h, while εvF increases.27 In other
terms, the range of elasticities of labor supply (1/εv) compatible with indeter-
minacy shrinks with h and heterogeneity in preferences stabilizes endogenous
ﬂuctuations.
Furthermore, as under constant returns, indeterminacy is ruled out and the
equilibrium becomes unique when heterogeneity is suﬃciently large (Proposition
4, case 2).28
Therefore, we are allowed to conclude that, when consumers have heteroge-
neous preferences, indeterminacy requires more restrictive conditions and can
be eventually eliminated. In other words, heterogeneity stabilizes expectations-
driven ﬂuctuations as it does under constant returns to scale, even if conditions
for indeterminacy look like quite diﬀerent.
5 Conclusion
On one side, a few papers have recently analyzed the role of heterogeneity be-
tween consumers on the stability properties of capital path, considering models
with inﬁnite-lived agents. On the other side, some authors have stressed the
crucial role of the propensity to save on the determinacy properties of equilibria
in overlapping generations economies with a representative consumer. In this
paper, we take a step forward by encompassing both the views: Considering
an overlapping generations economy with capital accumulation, consumption in
both periods and elastic labor supply, we analyze the inﬂuence of heterogeneity
in preferences, through propensities to save, on the occurrence of endogenous
ﬂuctuations.
Using a mean-preserving measure of dispersion, we show that under constant
returns to scale, the introduction of heterogeneous propensities to save reduces
the range of parameters such that ﬂuctuations due to self-fulﬁlling prophecies
emerge. In particular, indeterminacy no more occurs for a suﬃciently elastic
labor supply. Then, one may conclude that heterogeneity stabilizes endogenous
ﬂuctuations since they appear for a smaller range of parameters. Moreover,
indeterminacy can even be ruled out, when heterogeneity becomes greater than
a threshold. Introducing productive labor externalities, we prove the robustness
of these results in the case of increasing returns to scale.
Our framework enables us to draw clear-cut conclusions about the inﬂuence
of heterogeneity in preferences on indeterminacy. In contrast to some existing
27For a proof of ∂εvF /∂h > 0, see the Appendix.28Notice that, since h < 1/4, the second case in Proposition 4 is of interest. In fact h2 can
be strictly less than 1/4 and becomes weak when εψ is suﬃciently close to εψH (see equation(40)).
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paper of optimal growth, where the planner's solution is used to study the stabil-
ity eﬀects of heterogeneity (Ghiglino (2005), Ghiglino and Venditti (2006)), we
focus directly on the market regime and make some assumptions on preferences
(homogeneity, separability) to be able to provide parameters with economic sig-
niﬁcance and interpretation, like the propensity to save and the elasticity of
labor supply.
In our opinion, a further promising step could be to extend this research
line to market economies characterized by other forms of imperfections and
study whether heterogeneity robustly reduces the indeterminacy range and can
eliminate expectation-driven ﬂuctuations.
6 Appendix
Existence of si (rt+1). Equation (6) writes equivalently:
zi (ci1t/ci2t+1) ≡ Ui1 (ci1t/ci2t+1, 1)
Ui2 (1, ci2t+1/ci1t)
= rt+1
where zi is a strictly decreasing function. Then zi is invertible and ci1t =
z−1i (rt+1) ci2t+1. Using the budget constraints (4) and (5), the saving rate
si (rt+1) becomes: si (rt+1) =
[
1 + rt+1z−1i (rt+1)
]−1.
Elasticity of U∗i . Under Assumption 2, the Euler identity applies and, jointly
with (6), gives29:
Ui (1− si, sirt+1) = (1− si)Ui1 + siUi2rt+1 = Ui1 (41)
Using (41) and still (6), we have:
U∗′i (rt+1) rt+1 = [(Ui2rt+1 − Ui1) s′i + Ui2si] rt+1 = siUi2rt+1 = siUi1 = siU∗i
g (A) is an increasing function. The elasticity of g is computed from (10):
g′ (A)A
g (A)
= 1− λ1s1 (1− s1) (1− η1) + λ2s2 (1− s2) (1− η2)
λ1s1 + λ2s2
> 1− λ1s1 (1− s1) + λ2s2 (1− s2)
λ1s1 + λ2s2
> 0
since ηi > 0 for i = 1, 2.
Determinant D and trace T of the Jacobian matrix J . Using (1), (2)
and Assumption 1, we ﬁrst compute the factor price elasticities. Noting ri and
29In the sequel, we drop the unnecessary arguments of the functions.
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wi, i ∈ {k, l}, the derivatives of the real interest rate and the real wage with
respect to k and l, we have:[
krk/r lrl/r
kwk/w lwl/w
]
=
[ − (1− α) /σ (1− α) /σ + εψ
α/σ −α/σ + εψ
]
(42)
With the notation (li1, li2, li3, li4) ≡ (∂li/∂kt−1, ∂li/∂lt, ∂li/∂kt, ∂li/∂lt+1),
the elasticities of labor supply εij , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , 4, are deﬁned and obtained
from equations (15) as follows:[
εi1 εi2
εi3 εi4
]
≡
[
kli1
li
lli2
li
kli3
li
lli4
li
]
=
[
1
εvi
α
σ − 1εvi
(
α
σ − εψ
)
− siεvi
1−α
σ
si
εvi
(
1−α
σ + εψ
) ] (43)
after using the elasticities of U∗i (r) and v′i (li). Finally, deﬁne:
ε˜i3 ≡ εi3 − (1− si) (ηi − 1) (1− α) /σ (44)
ε˜i4 ≡ εi4 + (1− si) (ηi − 1) [(1− α) /σ + εψ] (45)
We linearize system (13)-(14) around the steady state (k, l) = (1, 1) with
l1 = l2 = 1 and we write the system in terms of elasticities (42). Equations (13)
and (14) become, respectively:
[1− (λ1s1ε˜13 + λ2s2ε˜23)w] dkt
k
− (λ1s1ε˜14 + λ2s2ε˜24)wdlt+1
l
= [(λ1s1ε11
+ λ2s2ε21)w + α/σ]
dkt−1
k
+ [(λ1s1ε12 + λ2s2ε22)w − (α/σ − εψ)] dlt
l
(46)
and
− (λ1ε13 + λ2ε23) dkt
k
− (λ1ε14 + λ2ε24) dlt+1
l
= (λ1ε11 + λ2ε21)
dkt−1
k
+ (λ1ε12 + λ2ε22 − 1) dlt
l
(47)
where w = 1/s is the stationary wage. Deﬁne now mn ≡ µ1sn1/εv1 + µ2sn2/εv2 ,
with µi ≡ λisi/ (λ1s1 + λ2s2) and n = −1, 0, 1. Substituting (43), (44) and
(45) in (46)-(47), we obtain the system (dkt/k, dlt+1/l)T = J (dkt−1/k, dlt/l)T ,
where:
J =
[
1−α
σ +
1
εs+m1
− 1−ασ − εψ
1−α
σ − 1−ασ − εψ
]−1 [ α
σ
m0+1
m1+εs
(
εψ − ασ
)
m0+1
m1+εs
α
σ
m−1
m0
(
εψ − ασ
) m−1
m0
− 1sm0
]
is the Jacobian matrix. The determinant and the trace of this matrix are:
D =
1 +m0
sm0
α
1− α+ σεψ
T = D − m−1
m0
+
σ + sm−1 − (m0 + 1) (α− sm0εψ) + (m1 + εs) (1− α− sm−1εψ)
sm0 (1− α+ σεψ)
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In particular, according to Assumption 3, εv1 = εv2 ≡ εv which implies
m−1 = s−1/εv, m0 = 1/εv, m1 = (µ1s1 + µ2s2) /εv. Using these expressions,
we ﬁnally obtain:
D =
wα (1 + εv)
1− α+ σεψ
T = D − w
+
εψ (1 + 1/εv) + w (1− α+ (σ − α) εv + (m1 + εs) [(1− α) εv − εψ])
1− α+ σεψ
or, equivalently, (23)-(24).
Proof of ∂εvF /∂h > 0. εvF is deﬁned by 1 + T +D = 0. Let
a ≡ σ + α+ εs (1− α) > 0
b ≡ 2 [α+ s (1− α)] + εψ [s− εs − σ (1− s)]
Using (23) and (24), εvF is solution of the following equation:
ε2va+ εv [b+ (1− α)h/s]− εψh/s = 0
More explicitly,
εvF =
−b− (1− α) hs +
√[
b+ (1− α) hs
]2
+ 4aεψ hs
2a
(48)
∂εvF
∂h
=
1− α
2as
 b+ (1− α) hs + 2aεψ1−α√[
b+ (1− α) hs
]2
+ 4aεψ hs
− 1

We notice that ∂εvF /∂h > 0 iﬀ
0 < b+
aεψ
1− α < b+ (1− α)
h
s
+
2aεψ
1− α
which is always true.
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